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SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC'S PROSECUTION BY THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A
HARBINGER OF THINGS TO COME FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE

I. INTRODUCTION

The idea of an international criminal justice system equipped
to deal with war crimes has intrigued the United Nations since its
inception in 1946.1 At the time the U.N. Charter was drafted, the
General Assembly resolved "to study the desirability and
possibility of establishing an international judicial organ ... ,,2
Since that time, however, the United Nations' efforts to establish a
permanent international criminal court have been ineffective. The
two most significant obstacles to establishing such a court have
been state sovereignty and cooperation. 3 As a result, this pursuit
remained relatively inactive for several decades. In the early
1990s, 4 however, the United Nations renewed its efforts to
establish an international criminal justice system. These new
efforts coincided with the escalation of the Balkan conflict, which
necessitated the first large scale, ad hoc criminal tribunal since
5
Nuremberg.

1. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Overview (visited Sept. 3,
1999) <http://www.un.org/law/icc/general/overview.htm>
[hereinafter ICC Statute
Overview].
2. Id. (referring to G.A. Res. 260, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)).
3. See generally Louise Arbour, The Status of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalsfor
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Goals and Results, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 37
(1999) (discussing the general problems and conflicts encountered in establishing both
courts and tribunals to adjudicate international criminal justice issues).
4. See ICC Statute Overview, supra note 1.
5. See Benjamin B. Ferencz, International Criminal Courts: The Legacy of
Nuremberg, 10 PACE INT'L L. REV. 203, 220-221 (1998). See also AGREEMENT FOR THE
PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS OF THE EUROPEAN
AxIs POWERS AND CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, Aug. 8,

1945, 54 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280 (entered into force Aug. 8, 1945) [hereinafter
NUREMBERG CHARTER].
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In 1994, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution

establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). 6
Immediately, the ICTY encountered
difficulty capturing and prosecuting its suspects. This was due, in
part, to state sovereignty, which is one of the main components of
international law and a significant roadblock to the successful
prosecution of war criminals. 7 Although the ICTY enjoys some
limited success, the problems with the ICTY call into question the

viability of a permanent international criminal court (ICC). This
issue has become more important with the passage of the ICC
8
Statute, which, if ratified, would establish the world's first ICC.
In 1998, 9 eighty-four nations signed the draft that, if ratified
by sixty countries, will set up the ICC.10 Questions remain,
however, as to whether an ICC should exist. Some of these
questions bring attention to the ICTY and its successes and
failures -as predictors of the viability of a permanent ICC
The ICTY's relationship with the ICC has become crucial
with Slobodan Milosevic's recent ICTY indictment for war crimes
committed in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999.11 Milosevic, as sitting
President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, could be the
highest-ranking state official to be indicted by a war crimes
tribunal since Nuremberg. 12 His prosecution will be the litmus
6. See United Nations: Security Council Resolution on Establishing an International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Law and Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 84th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827, reprintedin 32 I.L.M
1159, 1203 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
7. See Arbour, supra note 3, at 38-41. Arbour, a former ICTY Chief Prosecutor,
describes the problems the Tribunal faced in bringing those indicted to justice. See id.
8. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.183/9 (1998), reprintedin 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
9. See ICC Statute Overview, supra note 1.
10. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Ratification Status (visited
Sept. 3, 1999) <http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm> [hereinafter Ratification
Status].
11. See Statement by Louise Arbour, ICTY Prosecutor (visited Aug. 24, 1999)
<http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p404-e.htm>
[hereinafter
Arbour
Statement].
Prosecutor Arbour gave an official statement confirming the ICTY's indictment of
Milosevic and five other Serbian Officials. See id.
12. See generally Phyllis Hwang, Defining Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome
Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 457, 459-462 (1998)
(describing Nuremberg as the last court to try high-ranking state officials prior to the
ICTY's prosecution of Milosevic). "Nuremberg" was the victors court set up by the Allies
in the wake of World War II to prosecute war criminals (predominately those from Nazi
Germany). See id.
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test for the ICTY. More importantly, the problems encountered
during Milosevic's attempted prosecution expose the inherent
weaknesses, strengths, and dangers inherent in the proposed ICC.
This Comment discusses the relationship between the ICTY
and the ICC and explores how the ICTY's prosecution of
Milosevic exposes some of the most dangerous potential problems
with the ICC. Part II discusses the history of the ICTY and
recognizes that its successes and failures reveal the difficulties
inherent in any system of international criminal justice. Part III
demonstrates how the ICTY reveals the dangers present in the
proposed ICC. Specifically, the ICC poses a significant threat to
state sovereignty if used as a tool of political persuasion and has
the potential to subvert fair judicial process. Finally, Part IV
concludes by providing suggestions regarding the future of
international criminal tribunals and the ICC.
II. THE ICTY's PROSECUTION OF SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC

A. The History and Structure of the ICTY
Since its inception in 1993, the ICTY has been responsible for
the investigation, indictment, and prosecution of war criminals in
the area of the former Yugoslavia. 13 The ICTY, seated in the
14
Hague, consists of eleven judges elected for a term of four years;
no two judges may be from the same country. 15 The judges rotate
16
between sitting at the Trial and Appellate Chambers.
The Tribunal limits its subject matter jurisdiction to crimes
that occurred in the former Yugoslavia since January 1, 1991.17
The ICTY Rules of Evidence and Procedure,18 which govern the

13. See ICTY Statute Introduction, supra note 6, at 1164.
14. See id. arts. 11-12, at 1178-1179.
15. See id. art. 12, at 1178.
16. See AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991: RULES OF EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE R. 27. 33
I.L.M. 484, 505 (1994) [hereinafter ICIrY RULES OF EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE]. The

ICTY Trial and Appellate Chambers sit in the same fashion as do U.S. criminal trial and
appellate courts, with the exception being that the Appellate Chamber is the ICTY's
highest court of appeal. See id.

17. See ICTY Statute art. 8, supra note 6, at 1176.
18. See ICTY RULES OF EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 16.
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ICTY's operation, became effective on March 14, 1994.19 These
rules form the modern blueprint for international criminal
justice 20 and establish the first large-scale, ad hoc criminal court
since Nuremberg. 21 This comprehensive set of rules spawned
debate over the viability and legality of an international criminal
court. The four controversial aspects of the ICTY discussed below
are central to the debate over whether a permanent international
criminal court should, in fact, be established.
1. The ICTY's Jurisdiction
The ICTY has concurrent personal and subject matter
jurisdiction over the countries within the former Yugoslavia in
which alleged war crimes occurred. 22 The ICTY Statute provides
that "[t]he International Tribunal shall have primacy over national
courts." 23 The concept of primacy allows the ICTY to request
jurisdiction when appropriate. As a result, the ICTY prosecutor
can ask that the Trial Chamber "formally request national courts
to defer to the competence of the International Tribunal ...."24
This, however, can only occur under the proper circumstancesprimarily, when the prosecutor believes that the national courts
cannot, or will not, be impartial. 25 Jurisdictional problems with
this system occur when the country in question refuses to defer to
the ICTY. Even though the ICTY Statute mandates that "[s]tates
shall cooperate with International Tribunal in the investigation
and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious

19. See id. Introductory Note, at 484.
20. See generally id. at 484-490 (discussing the significance of the ICTY Rules of
Evidence and Procedure and how the ICTY uses them).
21. See Hwang, supra note 12, at 459-462.
22. See ICTY Statute art. 8, supra note 6, at 1176.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See ICTY RULES OF EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE R. 9, supra note 16, at 497.
Rule 9 states that where it appears to the prosecutor that:
(i) the act being investigated or which is the subject of those proceedings is
characterized as an ordinary crime; (ii) there is a lack of impartiality or
independence, or the investigations or proceedings are designed to shield the
accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case is not diligently
prosecuted; or (iii) what is in issue is closely related to , or otherwise involves,
significant factual or legal questions which may have implications for
investigations or prosecutions before the [t]ribunal. The prosecutor can then ask
the Trial Chamber for the State to defer to the competency of the court.
Id. R. 9, at 497.
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violations of international humanitarian law," 2627the fact that some
states refuse to cooperate is almost predictable.
2. State Cooperation and the Execution of Warrants
Voluntary and full state cooperation with the Trial
Chamber's orders is essential to the functioning of the ICTY.
Accordingly, "all States shall take any measures necessary under
their domestic law to implement the provisions of the present
resolution and the Statute, including the obligation of States to
comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by a Trial
Chamber ...

"28

The idea of state cooperation is not new to the international
community. For example, Rule 61 of the ICTY Rules of Evidence
and Procedure gives the ICTY power to order states to assist in
the capture of alleged war criminals by issuing international arrest
warrants. 29 Once the arrest warrant issues, states must "act
promptly and with all due diligence to ensure proper and effective
execution...." 30 Pursuant to Rule 61, the ICTY can request that
U.N. Member Nations take active roles in the arrest and capture
of indicted war criminals, including the freezing of assets. 31 Rule
61 is controversial because it allows the ICTY to compel
international assistance, even when it may be against a complying
state's interest to cooperate.
3. The Office of the Prosecutor
The Office of the Prosecutor plays a crucial role in the
ICTY's functioning. The Chief Prosecutor is appointed by the
U.N. Security Council for a term of four years to "act
independently as a separate organ of the International
Tribunal. 32 As a result, the prosecution, while acting as a

26. ICIY Statute art. 61, supra note 6, at 1189.
27. See Arbour, supra note 3, at 39 (discussing the fact that most states under
investigation will at least attempt to avoid the Court's jurisdiction, especially when it is
against the state's self interest to submit to the Court's jurisdiction).
28. ICTY RULES OF EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE R. 61, supra note 16, at 519-520.
Rule 61 is an example of a request for state cooperation. See id.

29. See id.
30. Id. at 517.
31. See id. at 519-520.
32. ICTY Statute arts. 15-16, supra note 6, at 1181-1182.
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separate office,33 does not receive instruction from any state or
political entity.
Furthermore, the prosecutor is responsible for conducting
34
investigations and submitting indictments to the Trial Chamber.
This gives the prosecutor almost complete discretion as to whom
the ICTY does and does not prosecute. Thus, the prosecutor
plays a key role in the ICTY's successes and failures.
4. The ICTY Statute's Definition of "War Crime"
The definition of "war crime," which has evolved since World
War II, encompasses several different acts. The International Law
Commission (ILC), established by the United Nations to study
war crimes, initially defined "war crime" as one occurring only
during an armed conflict. 35 This definition governed for several
decades. 36 The ICTY Statute, however, takes a different
37
approach and, as a result, expands the definition of a war crime.
The text of the ICTY Statute breaks down the traditional
notion of a war crime into four categories. 38 First, the ICTY has
the power to prosecute persons responsible for "committing or
ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949,,, 3 9 including willful killing and

unlawful deportation or transfer, among other crimes. 40 Second,
the ICTY may prosecute violations of the "Laws and Customs of
War," 4 1 including employing chemical weapons and purposefully
33. See id.
34. See id. art. 15, at 1181.
35. See Hwang, supra note 12, at 460-461 (describing the evolving definition of "war
crimes," specifically, how war crimes are defined in the statutes establishing the ICTY and
the ICC, and the problems with these definitions).
36. See id.
37. See ICTY Statute arts. 2-5, supra note 6, at 1171-1174.
38. See id.
39. Id. art. 2, at 1171. The ICTY Statute defines "grave breaches" as including:
(a) willful killing (b)torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments; (c) willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body of
health; (d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully or wantonly; (e) compelling a
prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power; (f) willfully
depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial; (g)
unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian; (h) taking
civilians as hostages.
Id.
40. See id. art. 2(a), (g), at 1171.
41. Id. art. 2, at 1171-1172.
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destroying civilian targets. 42 The third category of war crime is
genocide, which is defined as "acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group. .

. .

43 Finally, the fourth and most important category,

crimes against humanity, expands the definition of an ICTY war
crime.44
Crimes against humanity were first defined and recognized
during the Nuremberg trials in 1946. 45

The ICTY Statute's

definition is particularly important because it broadens the ILC's
initial notion that only those crimes committed during armed
conflict constituted crimes against humanity. 46 Pursuant to the
ICTY Statute, "[c]rimes against humanity are [those] aimed at any
civilian population and are prohibited regardless of whether they
are committed in an armed conflict, international or internal in
character." 47 The Statute further defines crimes against humanity
as,
"murder,
extermination,
enslavement,
deportation,
imprisonment, torture, rape, persecution on political, racial and
48
religious grounds, and other inhumane acts."
The ICTY's expansion of the war crimes definition to include
crimes against humanity that occur regardless of an armed conflict
has significant implications.
For example, an international
criminal court could prosecute government officials for
imprisoning people for perceived subversive political speech. The

42. See id. art. 3, at 1172, defining the "Laws and Customs of War" as:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause
unnecessary suffering; (b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity; (c) attack or bombardment, by
whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings or buildings; (d)
seizure of, destruction or wil[l]ful damage done to institutions dedicated to
religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments, and
works of art and science; (e) plunder of public or private property.

Id. art. 3 (a)-(e), at 1172.
43. Id. art. 4, at 1172. Article 4 defines "Genocide" as including:
(a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing

measures intended to prevent births within a group; (e) forcibly transferring
children of the group to another group.
Id. art. 4, at 1173.

44. See id.
45. See Hwang, supra note 12, at 459-460 & n.32.
46. See id. at 461-462.

47. ICTY Statute art. 4, supra note 6, at 1173.
48. Id. art. 4, at 1173-1174.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 22:553

ICTY has yet to truly test the "unarmed" conflict language,
however, because the conflict within its jurisdiction has been
armed. 49 Therefore, the extent of the definition's effect is not yet
clear.
B. The ICTY in Kosovo and Milosevic's Indictment
Since the early 1990s, the Balkans 50 have been in political and
ethnic turmoil. The area of the former Yugoslavia has been 51
a
focus of international concern regarding human rights violations.
Through the ICTY, this turmoil has become a testing ground for
the viability of a permanent system of international criminal
justice. Although the conflict in Kosovo is the latest in a long line
of conflicts in the region, it will be of crucial importance in
establishing the ICTY's legitimacy and the feasibility of a
permanent international criminal court.
1. The Conflict in Kosovo
The Kosovo region has historically been of particular political
and ethnic importance in the former Yugoslavia. It is a place of
interest for both Serbians and Albanians. 52 The Serbians see
Kosovo as a place of great ethnic significance as it is the site of the
53
defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the Fourteenth Century.
Before the present Kosovo conflict, however, the region was more
than ninety percent Albanian and enjoyed great autonomy from
the communist-era Yugoslavia. 54 As a result, the area that is
present day Kosovo is at the center of a conflict that existed
before the recent fighting in the Balkans.

49. See generally U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet, Kosovo Chronology (visited
May
21,
1999)
<http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs-kosovotimeline.html>
(describing the events in Kosovo and the nature of the armed conflict) [hereinafter Kosovo
Chronology].
50. See generally Eurasia Research Center, Balkans News Page (visited Aug. 29,
2000) <http://eurasianews.com/erc/balkan.htm> (describing each of the countries in the
Balkans and providing maps of the region as a whole).
51. See generally Kosovo Chronology, supra note 49 (discussing the timeline for the
modern conflict in the Balkan region).
52. See id.
53. See A
Kosovo
Primer, TIME DAILY
(visited
Oct.
1, 1999)
<http://www.pathfinder.com/time/daily/special/kosovo/primer.html> (providing a detailed
description of the specific events leading up to the crisis in Kosovo).
54. See id.
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The recent conflict in Kosovo began in 1989 when thenSerbian President Slobodan Milosevic called for the Kosovo
Assembly to relinquish the province's autonomous status. 55 The
Serbian majority then immediately passed legislation resulting in
Kosovo Albanians losing their jobs and homes. 56 Thereafter, the
57
Serbian majority dissolved the independent Kosovo Assembly.
In response to these acts, Kosovo Albanians created the littlerecognized Republic of Kosovo in 1991.58 The ongoing conflict
between Serbians and Kosovo-Albanians was overshadowed, for
several years, by wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and BosniaHerzegovina. 59
Fighting in those countries dominated the
landscape in the Balkans until 1997, when Serbians and Kosovo
Albanians began to clash again, thus disturbing the relative peace
60
of the era.
Throughout 1998, the Serbians continued raids and offensives
against Albanians in Kosovo. 61 In March, the United Nations
publicly condemned the Serbians' excessive use of force in Kosovo
thereby beginning its non-active involvement in Kosovo. 62 By Fall
1998, both the United Nations and the North American Treaty
Organization (NATO) actively called for withdrawal of Serbian
63
forces from Kosovo and a complete cease-fire.
After a brief cease-fire in early 1999, the conflict again
escalated with a full scale Yugoslav Serbian attack on Kosovo that
forced more than 4,000 ethnic Albanians from their homes. 64 On
March 24, 1999, NATO air strikes began as thousands of Kosovo
Albanians fled the region or were expelled by advancing Yugoslav
Serbian forces. 65 By April, the Kosovo exodus reached close to
20,000 people per day. 66 By the time the heavy fighting ended in

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Kosovo Chronology, supra note 49.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
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May, over 491,000 Kosovo Albanians fled or were deported to
67
Albania and Macedonia.
As a result of these mass deportations, consistent offensives
on the region, and the discovery of several mass graves, the ICTY
leveled indictments against Milosevic and four other Serbian
leaders. 68 Although all fighting stopped in June and the parties
reached a tentative peace agreement, the region remains
unstable. 69 The ICTY's problems in prosecuting Milosevic added
to the instability.70 In fact, several violent protests erupted calling
for Milosevic's resignation. 71 It is against this background and
these pressures that the ICTY tried to bring to justice one of the
most infamous alleged war criminals prosecuted by an
international criminal tribunal since Nuremberg.
2. The ICTY's Indictment and Prosecution of Slobodan Milosevic
On May 27, 1999, ICTY Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour
presented the indictments of Milosevic and four other Serbian
leaders to the ICTY Trial Chamber. 72 Judge David Hunt
promptly confirmed the indictments. 73 In the indictments, Arbour
laid out the prima facie case against Milosevic and four others
charging them with crimes against humanity and violations of the
laws and customs of war.74 Specifically, Milosevic was charged
with several crimes against humanity, including the killing of
75
unarmed civilians and deportation of 740,000 Kosovo Albanians.
The indictment further alleged that:

67. See id.
68. See Arbour Statement, supra note 11.
69. See Kosovo Chronology, supra note 49.
70. See Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Address to the United Nations General
Assembly (Nov. 8, 1999), available at <http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p445-e.htm>
[hereinafter McDonald Address].
71. See generally Misha Savic, Kosovo Serbs Resume Protests, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Sept. 10, 1999, available in 1999 WL 22042662 (discussing the general unrest and reaction
to Milosevic remaining in power); Yugoslav Prince Aleksonadar Calls for End of Belgrade
Regime with Anti-Belgrade Call, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE (Paris), Jan. 26, 2000, available
in 2000 WL 2720843.
72. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, No. IT-99-37, Decision on Review of Indictment and
Application for Consequential Orders, (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Trial Chamber,
May 24, 1999), available at (visited Aug. 29, 2000) <http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm>
[hereinafter Prosecutor v. Milosevic].
73. See id. para. 38.
74. See id. para. 1.
75. See id. para. 7.
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these operations targeting Kosovo Albanians were undertaken
with the objective of removing a substantial portion of the
Kosovo Albanian population from Kosovo, in an effort to
ensure continued Serbian control over the province. If these
pleaded facts are accepted, they establish that the forces from
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia persecuted the
Kosovo Albanian civilian population on political, racial or
religious grounds, and that there was both deportation and
murder, constituting crimes76against humanity and violations of
the laws or customs of war.
The prosecution's major obstacle in obtaining Milosevic's
77
indictment was connecting him to the alleged war crimes.
Arbour established this connection by showing that Milosevic was
the "President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces... with the power to
implement the National Defence Plan .. "78 The Armed Forces
came under Milosevic's control in March 1999 when he first
declared an imminent state of war, and then declared war on
March 20, 1999. 7 9 As a result, Milosevic placed himself at the top
of the military chain of command, and became responsible for the
actions of his troops. 80
Milosevic's position in the chain of
command provided the requisite causal link Arbour needed to
connect him to the crimes pursuant to the ICTY Statute. 81 Thus,
Arbour satisfied the elements of the prima facie case against
82
Milosevic and the ICTY executed his indictment.
3. Problems with Prosecuting Milosevic
After the indictment, Arbour was adamant that the ICTY
83
prosecute Milosevic; the only issue was "when and how."
According to Arbour, the ICTY's indictment of Milosevic, "set in

76. Id. para. 8.
77. See David S. Cloud & Carla Anne Robbins, Tribunal Readies War-Crimes
Indictment of Milosevic, WALL ST. J., May 27, 1999, at A21.

78. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, No. IT-99-37, Decision on Review of Indictment and
Application for Consequential Orders, para. 10(1) (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Trial
Chamber, May 24, 1999).
79. See Cloud & Robbins, supra note 77, at A21.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See War Crimes Prosecutor:Milosevic Will Face Prosecution, Dow JONES INT'L
NEWS SERV., July 12, 1999, available in WL 7/12/99 DJINS 14:49:00.
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motion a process that is completely irrevocable." 84 The ICTY's
commitment to prosecuting Milosevic makes bringing him to
85
justice crucial to the Tribunal's legitimacy.
Herein lies the conflict: even though the ICTY is clearly
committed to prosecuting Milosevic, it faces several significant
problems endemic to international criminal justice.
Its first
obstacle is capturing the indicted criminal. 8 6 If the territory in
which the indicted criminal resides does not submit to the ICTY's
jurisdiction, then the Tribunal has limited means of capturing the
suspect. The prosecutor, however, may compel the international
community's help pursuant to Rule 61 of ICTY Rules of Evidence
87
and Procedure.
Arbour submitted a Rule 61 request to the Trial Chamber
requesting the international community's assistance, which
formally served international arrest warrants for all five men on all
the members of the United Nations. Further, the Trial Chamber
sought orders to compel each member of the United Nations and
Switzerland to: "(i) make inquires to discover whether any of the
accused have assets located in their territory, and (ii) if any such
assets are found, adopt provisional measures to freeze those assets
...until the accused are taken into custody." 88 The warrants were
also served upon the International Criminal Police Organization
89
(INTERPOL) requesting its assistance.
Even with these powerful tools, the prosecution is still limited
in what it can do to capture a suspect. Most importantly, a
prosecutor cannot directly breach state sovereignty to capture a
suspect. 90 In Milosevic's case, as long as he stays within the
borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or any state not
submitting itself to U.N. jurisdiction, he is relatively safe from
ICTY prosecution. This reality is an embarrassment to the

84. Id.
85. See McDonald Address, supra note 70.
86. See id.
87. See ICrY RULES OF EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE R. 61, supra note 16, at 516,
519 (establishing that the prosecutor has the authority to request warrants pursuant to
Rule 61 in order to compel states to comply with the ICTY's requests and induce
international assistance to that end).
88. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, No. IT-99-37, Decision on Review of Indictment and
Application for Consequential Orders, para. 26(ii) (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Trial
Chamber, May 24, 1999).
89. See id. para. 24.
90. McDonald Address, supra note 70.
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ICTY's legitimacy. 91 Further, ICTY officials feel that Milosevic's
"[l]iberty makes a mockery of [the ICTY's] pledge to would-be
tyrants that they will be indicted, arrested and made to answer for
92
their alleged criminal acts and violations of human rights."
Hence, state sovereignty must be understood, and a workable
solution found, before a viable system of international criminal
justice is established.
State sovereignty, which is one of the fundamental bases of
94
international law, 93 allows each state to govern its own affairs.
"[S]overeignty is frequently the justification for states to demand
the non-intervention of other states in matters they consider to be
within their exclusive jurisdiction." 95 As a byproduct of this
independence, "[u]nder international law[,] states and other
international legal persons enjoy certain immunities from the
exercise of jurisdiction." 96 This means that states themselves can
either expand or limit jurisdiction. 97 Accordingly, "in determining
jurisdictional immunities to which an international legal person is
entitled, both international and municipal law" 98 must be
considered.
Therefore, in theory, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, or any other nation opposed to an international
tribunal's jurisdiction, may simply grant immunity to its citizens
and thereby limit the tribunal's ability to act. 99
Issues concerning jurisdiction are the logical outgrowth of the
notion that all states are sovereign entities. 100 In the context of

91. See id.
92. Id.
93. See Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS LVII
(1980) (explaining the rules and principles behind international law and the concept of
state sovereignty).
94. See generally id. (noting that states may allow international entities to gain
jurisdiction; the inverse conclusion is that they may also refuse to recognize international
entities' exercise of jurisdiction).
95. Anne Bodley, Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in International Law: The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 31 N.J.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
417, 421 (1999) (proffering that state sovereignty is an essential element to international
law and is frequently cited as the justification for a non-intervention policy).
96. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 93, at 490.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. See generally id. (noting that the principle of state sovereignty does not allow for
nations or political agencies to breach that sovereignty without consent; thus, if a country
will not allow the ICTY to enter and further refuses to punish the suspect in accordance
with domestic law there is little the ICTY can do to capture or prosecute the suspect).
100. See id.
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war crimes, where jurisdiction is crucial, a state's exercise of
sovereign immunity can be a complete roadblock. Therefore, it is
important to understand the manner in which jurisdiction is
established. The problem is that "[i]nternational law has not yet
developed a comprehensive set of rules defining with reasonable
precision all forms of jurisdiction that may be exercised by states
and other international legal persons." 10 1 Thus, the meaning and
scope of jurisdiction is dynamic and changes with the
circumstances.
What is more established is that "[u]nder
international law, the jurisdiction of a state depends on the
interest that state, in view of its nature and purposes, may
reasonably have in exercising the particular jurisdiction asserted..
",102

For example, in the case of a state facing prosecution for war
crimes, that state's interests in limiting the international court's
jurisdiction and reserving prosecution for its own national courts
may be very high. Thus, when cooperation conflicts with the state
in question's self-interest, it is unlikely that the state will cooperate
with a tribunal or international criminal court. Such is the case
with the ICTY's stand off with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
over Milosevic's prosecution.
It is often in a state's self-interest to invoke sovereign
immunity in war crimes prosecutions, thus presenting the
prosecuting entity with the frequently encountered and
troublesome dilemma of obtaining jurisdiction. The fact that
states almost always act out of self-interest is a major contributing
factor to the ICTY's problems with enforcing jurisdiction.
Because it is impossible to request that states act against their
respective interests without defeating the idea of state sovereignty,
problems with establishing jurisdiction will continue to plague any
system of international criminal justice.
C. The General Problems with the ICTY: A Lesson and Warning
for the ICC
Milosevic's prosecution demonstrates the problems inherent
in an international criminal justice system. ICTY Chief Prosecutor
Arbour recognizes these "inevitable limits imposed on the
Tribunals" as a result of their dependency on state cooperation in

101. Id. at 421.
102. Id.
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order to function. 10 3 Indeed, state cooperation is the key in all
aspects of the ICTY's operation, including conducting arrests and
gathering evidence. 10 4 Arbour believes that both the Office of the
Prosecutor and the ICTY have a "duty to advance every plausible,
credible, legal argument ...

to break the unhealthy dependency

on State cooperation.' 1 5 Clearly, Arbour views resolution of the
conflicts between state cooperation and sovereignty as key to
10 6
establishing an effective international criminal justice system.
Even before Milosevic's formal indictment, the political
process affected Milosevic's treatment by the ICTY. 10 7 At the
1994 Dayton Peace Accords, 10 8 which aimed to bring a truce and
eventual peace to the Balkans, "Milosevic was given de facto
immunity in exchange for his signature on the Dayton Peace
Accords." 10 9 Milosevic's later military actions in the Balkans hurt
the peace process and negated his immunity. 110 Still, Milosevic's
political importance remains an issue in his capture and
prosecution. The absence of ICTY action against Milosevic, gives
credibility to the idea that "Milosevic is only on notice because he
still may be needed to prevent harm to NATO forces and to make
yet another political settlement regarding Kosovo."' 111 Clearly,
international politics play a significant role in Milosevic's
prosecution.
These political dealings with Milosevic demonstrate the
"vulnerability of the Tribunals which are dependent on political

103. Arbour, supra note 3, at 38 (discussing recent ad hoc tribunals, their successes,
failures, strengths and inherent limitations).
104. See id.

105. Id. at 40-41.
106.
107.

See id.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity for International Crimes, 71 U. COLO.

L. REV. 409, 418-419 (noting that Milosevic was the center of special attention during the
Dayton Peace Accords, where he was given special de facto immunity in exchange for his
signature).
108. See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec.
14, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/50/810-S/1995/1021, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 175 (1996) [hereinafter

Dayton Peace Accords]. See also University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, Office
of the Spokesman, Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina (Nov.
30, 1995) <http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/icty/dayton/daytonsum.html> (summarizing the
political agreements and truces achieved at the Dayton Peace Accords and discussing the
requirements and conditions of the cease-fire).
109. Bassiouni, supra note 107, at 419.
110. See id.
111. Id.
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interests." 112 This exposes a second problem with the ICTY: that
as an organ of the U.N. Security Council, which relies on each
individual state's political institutions for cooperation and
enforcement, it is constantly confronted with international
113
political issues.
Although the ICTY has taken steps to minimize its
dependency on the international community, there are limits to
the ICTY's self-sufficiency. 114 The ICTY depends on the U.N.
Security Council for assistance in executing warrants and
gathering evidence. 115 The ICTY has no independent ability to
enforce its instruments other than issuing orders, which are
ineffective without enforcement. 116 Thus far, the ICTY and the
U.N. Security Council have encountered significant problems
gaining full cooperation with and enforcement of ICTY orders.11 7
This lack of enforcement power "sets a very dangerous precedent
if the [U.N. Security] Council, to which the maintenance of peace
has been entrusted, allows its orders to be flouted with
118
impunity."
Effective enforcement is especially crucial in an international
community that is often hostile to cooperation. 119 According to
Arbour, "[w]hat States say pales in comparison to States' deeds,
and their deeds are exclusively dictated by their perceived self
interest[s]. '' 120 This overriding self-interest leads to lack of state
cooperation-especially for states under investigation for alleged
war crimes. This fact is reflected in the sentiment that, "we should
not expect any better from States because of their clear self
interest in not seeing criminal justice succeed." ' 12 1
In his address to the United Nations in November 1999, thenretiring ICTY President, Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald
112. Id. at 418.
113. See id. at 418-420.
114. See id.
at 419.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 418.
117. See Ferencz, supra note 5, at 222 (discussing the evolution of the International
Criminal Court and specifically the problems with, and prospects of, the current system of
ad hoc tribunals).
118. Id. (discussing the problems concerning the U.N. Security Council's lack of
effective enforcement of the ICTY's orders as part of the larger problem of political codependence that significantly restrains the Court's efforts).
119. See Arbour, supra note 3, at 38-39.
120. Id. at 39.
121. Id.
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acknowledged the conflict between compliance and state selfinterest.122 According to McDonald, "the important work of the
Tribunal is being hindered by the non-compliance of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, Republic of Croatia and the Republika
Srpska."' 123 Echoing Arbour's sentiments, McDonald
noted that
124
"[t]here is simply no substitute for compliance."'
In assessing the consequences of failing to effectively address
compliance and enforcement issues, 125 McDonald stated:
Make no mistake about it: if the international community does
not ensure that the orders of the [ICC] are enforced, it is bound
to go the way of the League of Nations ....
No court can
function effectively without meaningful methods of enforcing
126
its Orders and Decisions. The Tribunal is no different."
McDonald's point is well taken. The prospect of establishing an
ICC is a noble one-its purpose full of promise but with
potentially broad powers that could be misdirected or
misappropriated. The ICTY's relationship with the U.N. Security
Council illustrates that if careful thought is not given to the ICC's
powers-to both expanding and limiting them-the ICC may be
an experiment in which the idea is the only positive component in
its operation.
Understanding the considerable difficulties international
criminal justice faced with the ICTY, 127 questions now arise as to
what improvements, if any, can be made to make the system more
effective and efficient; whether the proposed ICC Statute
advances these goals; and finally, whether the ICC, in its present
form, is a desirable mechanism to replace the current system of ad
hoc criminal justice.
III.

PROBLEMS WITH THE ICTY ILLUSTRATE THAT THE ICC
STATUTE IS NOT A DESIRABLE IN ITS PRESENT FORM

In June and July 1998, 164 Nations met in Rome to finalize
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC
122. See McDonald Address, supra note 70 (summarizing the Court's achievements
and making observations regarding the challenges the ICTY and international criminal
justice in general face).
123.
124.

Id.
Id.

125. See id.
126. Id.
127. See supra Part II (discussing some of the principal problems facing the ICTY).
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Statute or Rome Treaty). 128 If ratified by sixty nations by January
2001, the ICC Statute will establish the world's first permanent
international criminal court. 129 Proponents of the ICC Statute
believe that it is the solution to the problems inherent in
prosecuting war criminals, which have plagued criminal courts
130
since Nuremberg.
The ICC Statute establishes "the principle of individual
criminal accountability for all who commit such acts as a
cornerstone of international criminal law." 131 According to the
Statute's drafters:
Once it is clear that the international community will no longer
tolerate such monstrous acts without assigning responsibility
and meting out appropriate punishment-to heads of State and
commanding officers as well as the lowliest soldiers in the field
or militia recruits-it is hoped that those who would incite a
genocide; embark on a campaign of ethnic cleansing; murder,
rape and brutalize civilians caught in armed conflict; or use
children for barbarous
medical experiments will no longer find
132
willing helpers.
This proposal seems to describe a system of enforcement based on
principles of deterrence. This goal reflects the optimism of the
ICC, purportedly embodies the long sought-after ideals of
international criminal justice. The question now, however, is what
price the international community is willing to pay for this kind of
justice and whether the ICC has the power and authority to
accomplish its lofty goals.
A. The ICC Statute Does Not Solve the Inherent Conflict Between
State Sovereignty and Cooperation
The proposed ICC will be comprised of eighteen judges and a
prosecutor who, together, will be responsible for prosecuting
alleged war criminals. 133 The ICC will have jurisdiction in cases of

128. See ICC Statute, supra note 8. See also ICC Statute Overview, supra note 1
(providing a general overview of the events leading up to the creation of the ICC Statute
and describing the purpose and ideological focus of the ICC); Brown, supra note 156, at
856.
129. See ICC Statute art. 126, supra note 8, at 1068.
130. See ICC Statute Overview, supra note 1.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See ICC Statute arts. 35-36, 42, supra note 8, at 1020-1026.
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genocide, 134 crimes against humanity, 135 war crimes, 136 and the
crime of aggression. 137 The definitions of these crimes were
clarified and simplified from their applications in the ICTY
139
Statute, 138 but their basic provisions remain the same.
The ICC will have jurisdiction over crimes committed in any
state submitting to its jurisdiction by signing or ratifying the Rome
Treaty. 140 If a state wherein alleged war crimes occurred is not a
party to the ICC Statute, the state can submit to the ICC's
jurisdiction for that offense only. 141 The ICC can also refuse
jurisdiction and demand that the state prosecute its own
143
nationals. 142 The ICTY Statute contains the same principle.
Unlike the ICTY, however, the ICC does not have the express

134. See id. art. 6, at 1004.
For the purpose of this Statute, 'genocide' means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethinical, racial
or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Id.
135. See id. art. 7, at 1004-1005. "Crimes against humanity," under the ICC Statute,
means:
systematic attack directed against any civilian population" that results in: '(a)
Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement (d) Deportation or the forcible
transfer of population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law (f) Torture (g)
Rape, sexual slavery... ' among other crimes including the crime of apartheid.
Id.
136. See id. art. 8, at 1006. "War Crimes" include:
(i) Willful killing (ii) Torture of inhumane treatment, including biological
experiments; (iii) Willfully causing great suffering, or serious bodily injury to
body or health (iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly; (v)
Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of
a hostile power; (vi) Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected
person of the rights of a fair and regular trial; (vii) Unlawful deportation...
(viii) Taking of hostages.
Id. These war crimes must occur as part of a "plan or policy." Id.
137. See id.
138. Compare id. arts. 5-8, at 1003-1006 with ICTY Statute arts. 2-5, supra note 6, at
1171-1174.
139. See ICC Statute art. 8, supra note 8, at 1006.
140. See id. art. 12, supra note 8, at 1010.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See ICTY RULES OF EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE R. 9, supra note 16, at 497.
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power 4to request a deferral of jurisdiction by a non-signatory
14
state.
Limiting the ICC's jurisdiction begs the question of whether
the ICC will do anything to improve the functioning and efficacy
of ad hoc tribunals like the ICTY. Proponents of the ICC claim
that one of its improvements is that it has increased latitude over
when and where it can punish war crimes because the ICC's
jurisdiction is not "subject to the limits of time or place. ' 145
Although an ad hoc tribunal's jurisdiction is generally limited, for
instance the ICTY's jurisdiction is limited to the area of the
former Yugoslavia, 146 this does not support the contention that
these limits will hinder a tribunal's overall effectiveness. In fact,
limited jurisdiction may have distinct advantages.
Indeed, the ad hoc tribunal system has some distinct
advantages when it comes to conflicts between state sovereignty
and jurisdiction. First, the ICTY relationship with the U.N.
Security Council is a symbiotic one-the latter providing the
former with political and foreign policy support. 147
This
relationship has not proven totally effective or desirable, but at
least it is in place. Conversely, the ICC's relationship with the
U.N. Security Council has yet to be determined. 148 Establishing
and defining the roles in this relationship is crucial because the
ICC has no other mode of enforcement. 149 Yet, the United
Nations been unable to resolve the ICTY's jurisdiction difficulties
because it, too, must adhere to established international law and
thus is subject to the same constraints.
Resolving state sovereignty issues will be essential in the
effective implementation of any international criminal justice
system. It is also necessary to examine how the ICC, with
jurisdiction broader than that of the ICTY, could be used for
purposes other than those for which it was explicitly designed.

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
that the

Compare id. R. 61, at 516 with ICC Statute art. 12, supra note 8, at 1010.
ICC Statute Overview, supra note 1.
See ICTY Statute art. 8, supra note 6, at 1176.
See id. Introduction, at 1167-1169.
See ICC Statute art. 2, supranote 8, at 1003.
See id. The ICC Statute does not specify modes of enforcement-it only indicates
ICC will rely on the U.N Security Council.
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1. The Dangers Political Enforcement Poses to a Fair System of
Justice and the Role of the U.N. Security Council.
Currently, the ICTY interacts with the U.N. Security Council
to facilitate execution and enforcement of its orders. 150 As
discussed above, co-dependence leads to political problems, which
have been troublesome for the ICTY. 151 Interaction between the
ICTY and the U.N. Security Council, however, is unavoidable
and, in fact, imperative to the effective functioning of any
international criminal court. 152 This is because "the Tribunal lacks
the independent coercive mechanisms and relies on the Security
Council to adopt effective measures to compel state
153
cooperation."
Although the role of the U.N. Security Council is of the
utmost importance in establishing an effective ICC, the ICC
Statute is largely silent on the Security Council's role with regard
154
to enforcing ICC orders and compelling state cooperation.
There are indications in the ICC Statute that its drafters
envisioned an important role for the United Nations, but its
specific duties and responsibilities remain largely undefined. 155
One of the few places where the Security Council is specifically
mentioned, in the ICC Statute Article 16 veto provisions, presents
156
an issue that some critics consider troublesome.
2. The Article 16 Veto-Jurisdiction and Compliance
The ICC Statute gives the Security Council the ability to
delay the prosecution or investigation of a suspected war criminal
for twelve months. 157 The delay process can be repeated

150. See ICTY Statute art. 8, supra note 6, at 1176.
151. See Arbour, supra note 3, at 38.
152. See McDonald Address, supra note 70.
153. Id.
154. See ICC Statute art. 2, supra note 8, at 1003.
155. See id. art. 2, at 1003.
156. See generally Bantram S.Brown, U.S. Objections to the Statute of the International
Criminal Court: A Brief Response, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 855, 858 (1999)
(describing the United State's objection to the ICC).
157. See ICC Statute art. 16, supra note 8, at 1012. Article 16, entitled "Deferral of
investigation or prosecution," provides:
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this
statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested
the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the
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indefinitely. 158
This provision represents an attempted
159
compromise with the United States at the Rome Conference.
The United States' reaction to the possibility of ICC
jurisdiction may be representative of the attitudes of other
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, 160 none of
which have ratified the ICC Statute. 161 Although the United
States is a supporter of international justice, the U.S. Government
demanded that it receive veto power over all actions involving
U.S. citizens. 162 This demand comes from the United States'
concern over "possible ICC prosecution of U.S. personnel after
U.S. military activity abroad. ' 163 The Article 16 veto power,
known as the "Helms Standard,' ' 164 is a major point of contention
165
in the possible enactment of the ICC Statute.
Even though the United States generally supports the
concept of an ICC,166 U.S. Government Officials declared the ICC
Statute "fatally flawed" and announced that the U.S. Government
"will neither sign nor ratify the treaty in its present form."' 167 This
is because the veto power is neither absolute nor specific to the

same conditions.
Id.
158. See id. Article 16 does not provide any temporal or quantitative restrictions on
the renewal of a stay of prosecution. See id.
159. See Brown, supra note 156, at 857-860.
160. See generally Security Council, Members (visited Sept. 3, 1999)
<http://www.un.org/Overview/Organs/sc.html> (listing the five permanent member of the
U.N. Security Council: China, France, the United Kingdom, Russian Federation and the
United States).
161. See Ratification Status, supra note 10. As of August 2000, only fifteen countries
had ratified the ICC Statute. Also, of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council, only France and the United Kingdom signed the Rome Statute-China, Russia
and the United States did not participate. See id.
162. See Brown, supra note 156, at 858.
163. See id. at 865.
164. Id. at 858. The "Helms Standard" is the name given to the United State's
ultimatum regarding its absolute veto of the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction over U.S.
citizens. See id. U.S. Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, sent a letter to Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, stating that with
regard to the ICC Statute "[w]ithout a clear U.S. veto [the ICC Statute] ...will be deadon-arrival at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee." Id.
165. See generally id. (discussing the United States' demands for an absolute veto on all
prosecutions of U.S. citizens and the political ramifications thereof).
166. See id.
167. Id. at 856.
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United States. 168 This U.S. stance caused a rift with the smaller
states that participated in the Rome Conference. 169 In fact:
the security council veto privilege, so cherished by the United
States and other permanent members of the Council, is
resented by many developing countries of the south. Even
many U.S. allies believed that extending veto privileges to ICC
investigations and prosecutions would compromise
the principle
170
of a uniform global standard of justice.
The United States' insistence on receiving the absolute veto
power illustrates the fact that states act almost solely out of self
interest. This is a seemingly unavoidable consequence of the
fundamental principle of state sovereignty. 171 Further, the veto
issue demonstrates that the conflicts between non-compliance and
self-interest are not, and will not, limited solely to states under
investigation. By demanding the Helms Standard, the United
States effectively declared that it supports the ICC's efforts to
exercise jurisdiction over other nations but will not allow the
Court to exercise jurisdiction over U.S. citizens. Consequently,
the ICC Statute, in its present form, will not hold the U.S. military
accountable in the same manner as it will the military forces of
other countries' that ratify the ICC. Whether there can be an
effective international system of justice in which some nations are
basically immune from prosecution is decidedly questionable.
3. The Article 16 Veto and the Politicization of a Fair Judicial
Process
Although the ICC Statute does not presently include an
absolute veto provision, Article 16 of the ICC Statute provides for
a limited renewable veto. 172 This provision is just as troublesome
as an absolute veto because it represents the same policy threatnamely, that any veto is seemingly contrary to a system of
equitable justice. Moreover, this veto power may be more
dangerous than if the United States were given exclusive veto
power over all prosecutions and investigations of U.S. citizens

168. See id. at 858. See also ICC Statute art. 16, supra note 8, at 1012.
169. See Brown, supra note 156, at 857.
170. Id. at 858-859.
171. See generally Arbour, supra note 3, at 38-41 (noting that difficulties with
jurisdiction are part of the ICTY's problems in capturing alleged war criminals).
172. See id.
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because it will allow the political process to further invade this
system of justice. This is true because to promote their interests,
the more powerful states will have to coerce smaller states to vote
with them. The more political the system becomes, the harder it
will be to administer impartial justice.
Moreover, the veto provides that the U.N. Security Council
can pass a resolution delaying a prosecution or investigation for
one year. 173 This allows the Security Council to maintain some
control over who the ICC prosecutes. This control is problematic
because the ICC relies on the Security Council to execute and
enforce the ICC's orders. 174 Essentially the Security Council is
the ICC's police force-and the veto provision allows the "police"
to dictate when the ICC may do its job.
Additionally, this control creates a situation wherein politics
play a central role in the ICC's operation; this may create a
conflict with the ICC's purported role as an independent
judiciary. 175 For example, it is conceivable that the ICC will have
to consider objections from Members of the Security Council each
time it decides to prosecute a war criminal. Instead of the Security
Council becoming an enforcement organ of the ICC, the ICC may
become an organ of the Security Council.
Potentially more troublesome is how this relates to the ICC's
state sovereignty and jurisdiction issues. Any member of the
Security Council, or signatory state, may initiate investigations at
anytime. 176 This may allow at least the five permanent members
of the Security Council to use their political sway to either initiate
or prevent the ICC's prosecution of other states. 177 The only

173. See id.
174. See ICC Statute art. 53-54, supra note 8, at 1029-1030.
175. See id. art. 40, at 1023.
176. See id. art. 14, at 1011. Article 14, entitled "Referral of a situation by a State
Party," provides:
A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed
requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the purpose of
determining whether one or more specific persons should be charged with the
commission of such crimes.
Id.
177. See Security Council, supra note 160. "Decisions on substantive matters require
nine votes including the concurring votes of all five permanent members. This is the rule
of 'great Power unanimity,' often referred to as the 'veto' power." Id. This means that in
order to enforce their respective wills, each permanent member must sway the other
members to vote with it-thus clearly, politics will invade this process.
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significant deterrent to this political subversion of the fair judicial
process is the structure of the ICC's jurisdiction. 178 Unlike the
ICTY, the "jurisdiction of the ICC, as set out in the Rome
[Treaty], is built upon the unquestioned right of States to
prosecute crimes committed on their territory or by their
'180
nationals." 179 Although this is not "universal jurisdiction
allowing the ICC to penetrate state sovereignty to capture war
criminals without fear of retribution, it is more expansive in that it
is not limited to a specific area like the ICTY's jurisdiction. The
ICC Statute allows any signatory state to be subject to the ICC's
jurisdiction upon request. This process could potentially be used
for political leverage and gain.
Supporters of the ICC, however, believe that just because the
ICC could be used for an improper or political purpose, this
should not defeat the establishment of the Court. 181 They further
contend that "[p]ossibilities for corruption, venality and
inefficiency can be found in courts everywhere, but to suggest that
because abuses are imaginable courts should not exist is to doubt
the rule of law itself."'182 ICC supporters ask the international
community to support the Court based on the integrity of the legal
process and its goals for establishing international justice. 183
Unfortunately, the international community's actions do not
reflect the ICC supporters' optimism. As some admit, "[p]owerful
nations are surely tempted to retain the advantages of power just
as less powerful states understandably resent being deprived of
democratic equality." 184 As a result, it can at least be said that
although the kind of justice that the ICC proposes to create is
desirable, many of the most powerful and influential nations do

178. See generally Brown, supra note 156, at 858-859 (noting that the ICC would be
limited to prosecuting the crimes enumerated in the ICC Statute, and doing so only in the
countries that ratified the Statute).
179. Id. at 874.
180. Id.
181. See generally Ferencz, supra note 5, at 231-235 (recognizing that any court or
system of criminal justice has the potential for corruption or abuse, but the compelling
need to facilitate prosecution of war criminals far outweighs any dangers the ICC may
pose to state sovereignty).
182. Id. at 232.
183. See id. at 231-235.
184. Id. at 232.
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not want the ICC Statute enforced against them or their
185
interests.
Whether the United States or any of the permanent members
of the U.N. Security Council decide to ratify the ICC Statute, it
will still exist in the ICC's system of justice. For example, if the
ICC is ratified and goes into effect, the permanent members will
still have the power to stay prosecutions even if they themselves
are not bound to the ICC's jurisdiction. 186 This seems to be a
probable result because the United States vowed not to ratify the
ICC Statute. 187 Thus, similar to the effect of the ICTY, the
institution of state sovereignty will be weakened for most states
but will, in effect, be strengthened for the five permanent
188
members of the Security Council.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE AD Hoc TRIBUNAL SYSTEM SHOULD
REMAIN IN PLACE UNTIL A MORE COMPREHENSIVE, AND LESS
POLITICALLY BASED SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

CAN BE DEVELOPED.

When the ICC Statute, as a whole, is analyzed, it becomes
clear that it may not do enough to improve on the current ad hoc
tribunal system to justify its adoption at this time. The ICTY's
prosecution of Slobodan Milosevic exposes this fact. Even though
the ICTY knows his capture and prosecution are essential to its
legitimacy, and that of an ICC, it has been unable to bring him to
justice. This is not a failure of the ICTY, but rather an indication
of the difficulties inherent in international criminal justice.
The crucial question for the ICC is whether the proposed
ICC Statute could bring Milosevic to justice with more speed or
ease than could the ICTY. The answer is no because the ICC
Statute does not effectively solve the principle problems with the
ICTY, namely state sovereignty and cooperation. Further, the
ICC would be unable to escape the inevitable political obstacles it
faces. The reasons for this conclusion are simple: no system of
international criminal justice can accomplish more than has the
ICTY without participating states' consent and cooperation. The

185. See generally Brown, supra note 156, at 858 (discussing the United States' demand
that it be entirely immune from the ICC Statute).
186. See ICC Statute art. 16, supra note 8, at 1012.
187. See Brown, supra note 156, at 856.
188. See Bodley, supra note 95, at 469-470.
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problem is that states view the Court's jurisdiction as an invasion
of sovereignty-a situation that the ICC cannot, and does not,
change.
Moreover, the debate surrounding the ratification of the ICC
Statute makes clear that not all nations want international justice
at any price. The United States has unequivocally states that it
will only accept the ICC Statute on its own terms. 189 Additionally,
because of the way the ICC is set up, the permanent members of
the U.N. Security Council will retain a controlling interest in the
ICC regardless of whether they ratify the ICC Statute. 190 Thus,
the idea that "1n]o court can be effective unless it can rely on the
good faith of nations prepared to be bound by its terms" 191 is
critical to understanding the ICC Statute's greatest flaw because
clearly not all nations are prepared to submit to the ICC's
jurisdiction.
Further, the ICC may be dangerous in its operation. Beyond
possible judicial or prosecutorial corruption is the probability that
the ICC would quickly be used as a political tool. The ICC Statute
facilitates politicization by providing the limited renewable veto
power to the Security Council. 192 It is not difficult to imagine how
the ability to stay prosecutions could be used as a political tool.
On the other hand the ICTY, and indeed ad hoc tribunals in
general, are not as susceptible to these problems for one simple
reason-they are limited in scope and jurisdiction. 193 Further,
they have proven successful. Although politics clearly play a part
in the ICTY, 194 and the ICTY has problems with state sovereignty
and cooperation, both issues are seemingly unavoidable and
endemic to any international criminal court. The danger of the
ICTY being used as a political tool, however, is not as broad or
potent as it is with the ICC and its broad powers and jurisdiction.
Because the ICC Statute does little to significantly improve on the

189. See Brown, supra note 156, at 856.
190. See ICC Statute art. 16, supra note 8, at 1012.
191. See Ferenecz, supra note 5, at 232 (explaining that it is imperative for the
international community to support the ICC-otherwise, it cannot function effectively).
192. See supra Part III (discussing the potential effect of granting a veto power to the
five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council).
193. See ICTY Statute arts. 8-9, supra note 6, at 1176-1177.
194. See supra Part III (discussing the potential and actual involvement of political
issues in the arrest and capture of Slobodan Milosevic and other alleged war criminals).
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ad hoc international criminal justice system, the international
community should continue to rely on the tribunal system.
Establishing a functioning, effective international criminal
law system is a noble and worthy goal. The international
community has gone to great lengths to establish the precepts of
such a system through the ICTY and its progeny, the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.1 95 The fact that the international
community even indicted Slobodan Milosevic is a significant step.
The reasons why Milosevic has not been brought to justice are
crucial to the future of international criminal justice. The
problems encountered in his prosecution by the ICTY, namely
sovereignty, politics, and state cooperation, are just a few of the
issues facing the ICC. 196 Further, many states, including the
United States through its unwillingness to accept several concepts
that are central to the ICC's operation, have shown that the
international community is not ready to accept an ICC that
operates without prejudice.
As a result, the International
Criminal Court is an idea and an institution whose time has yet to
come.
William Miller*

195. See Ferencz, supra note 5, at 223. The Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which
followed the ICTY, is ineffective due to problems locating those responsible for alleged
war crimes. See id. See also Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res.
955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).

196. See supra Part II (discussing four of the dominant problems with the ICTY). This
Comment primarily focuses on the sovereignty and state cooperation issues with regard to
enforcement of orders. There are, however, countries with significant reservations about
the ICC based on its definitions of crimes and the breath of the prosecutor's powers. See
Brown, supra note 156, at 563-571. Although, not discussed herein, these reservations
must be considered in completing a full analysis of the potential problems confronting the
ICC.
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